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teaching Justice after MacIntyre: toward a 
Catholic Philosophy of Moral Education 
Roger Bergman
Creighton University
How is the commitment to social justice sustained over a lifetime? This would 
seem to be a matter of character, and that calls attention to the Aristotelian 
tradition in ethics. No one provides as much insight into the challenge of the 
contemporary	appropriation	of	this	tradition	as	Alasdair	MacIntyre.	Although	
a	moral	philosopher	rather	than	a	moral	educator,	MacIntyre’s	critique	of	the	
failure of the Enlightenment project to construct a rationally based universal 
ethic,	coupled	with	a	critique	of	the	modern	nation-state	of	liberal	capitalism	as	
antithetical to the practice of virtue for the common good, provides a challeng-
ing if controversial context in which moral educators might think about justice 
pedagogy today. 
Peace and justice programs have a strong presence at Catholic universi-ties. What constitutes best practice in the preparation of undergradu-ates	to	be	insightful	and	faith-filled	agents	for	social	change?
Two	questions	dominate	most	reflections:	(a)	How	is	a	commitment	to	
the	difficult	work	of	social	justice	provoked	in	the	first	place?	and	(b)	How	is	
that	commitment	sustained	over	a	lifetime?	The	philosopher	Marcel	provides	
a	pointed	answer	to	the	first	question:	“Through	personal	encounter.	Nothing	
else ever changes anyone in any important way” (as cited in Maguire, 1985, 
p.	78).	Want	to	provoke	a	new	openness	to	questions	of	social	justice?	Then	
offer opportunities for personal encounter with the victims of injustice. 
But once an initial commitment to social justice is born, how do any of 
us	make	this	a	defining	pattern	of	our	lives	over	the	long	haul?	That	would	
seem to be a matter of character, and that calls our attention to the Aristotelian 
tradition in ethics, a perspective Kohlberg (1970) early in his career famously 
dismissed as a relativist “bag of virtues” (p. 59), although he later had second 
thoughts (Power, Higgins, & Kohlberg, 1989). 
No one, in the opinion of this researcher, provides as much insight into 
the challenge of the contemporary appropriation of this tradition as Alasdair 
MacIntyre. Although a moral philosopher rather than a moral educator, 
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MacIntyre’s critique of the failure of the Enlightenment project to construct a 
rationally based universal ethic, coupled with a critique of the modern nation-
state of liberal capitalism as antithetical to the practice of virtue for the com-
mon good, provides a challenging if controversial context in which Catholic 
educators might think about justice pedagogy today. For the purpose of this 
essay “moral education” and “justice education” are used interchangeably.
This paper will proceed in six steps, each asking a question. First, are we 
all	anonymous	Aristotelians? MacIntyre’s (1998b) argument that Aristotelian 
practical reason is the best tradition of ethical practice we have available to 
us will be outlined. This article recapitulates in highly condensed form some 
of the much more developed arguments of MacIntyre’s major books (1984, 
1988,	1990).	Second,	how	does	MacIntyre	understand	the	moral	self?	That	
will introduce an explication of MacIntyre’s conception of personal identity 
as the narrative unity of a life formed by social practices, with their necessary 
virtues, within a living tradition of moral enquiry. But that raises a further is-
sue about the possibility of virtuous living in our present context, so different 
from the Greek polis that gave rise to Aristotle’s virtue ethics, from which 
MacIntyre takes inspiration. That takes us to our third question: Are we all, or 
should	we	be,	anonymous	revolutionary	Aristotelians?	Knight’s	(1996)	work	
provides insight here, which MacIntyre (Knight, 1998) himself recommends 
as an accurate depiction of his political views, including the belief that the 
practice of virtue today demands embodiment in local communities of resis-
tance to injustice. But if that is a broad prescription for moral education, what 
is MacIntyre’s analysis of the actual practice of moral education in America 
today? That	is	the	fourth	step.	A	fifth	question	of	particular	pertinence	to	edu-
cators in the Catholic social teaching tradition is can the language of human 
rights be legitimately preserved as central to programs of justice education 
despite MacIntyre’s claim that human rights are no more real than witches or 
unicorns? The insights of theologian Hollenbach (1994) help us to answer in 
the	affirmative.	Finally,	what	are	the	practical	implications	for	Catholic	edu-
cators?	Three	brief	examples	from	primary,	secondary,	and	higher	education	
are offered.
Are We All Anonymous Aristotelians? 
MacIntyre (1998b) means by “plain person” (p. 138) a rational human being 
concerned for his or her own good who is not a professional moral philoso-
pher. He does point out, however, that in her or his practical life, the moral 
philosopher continues to be a plain person faced by the same kinds of ques-
tions and challenges as anyone else. To the extent that a plain person thinks 
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reflectively	about	his	or	her	own	good	and	the	human	good	per se, he or she 
becomes a moral philosopher, if not a professional theorist. Plain persons 
need not study the Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle, 1925/1998) although it is 
clear MacIntyre thinks it would be a good idea. 
MacIntyre’s (1998b) major thesis is that “plain persons are in fact gener-
ally	and	to	a	significant	degree	proto-Aristotelians”	(p.	138).	Here	is	the	key	
insight. In the ordinary activities of personal, familial, and social life, “one 
inescapably discovers oneself as a being in norm-governed direction toward 
goals which are thereby recognized as goods” (pp. 138-139). 
These norm-governed directednesses are what Aquinas [a good Aristotelian] 
calls [inclinations]….It is in virtue of our relationship to these…[inclinations], 
partially	defining	as	they	do	our	nature	as	human	agents,	that	the	precepts	of	the	
natural law are so called. (p. 139) 
That is, if we are paying attention to the intrinsic requirements of human 
interaction in our ordinary lives, we are learning the precepts of the 
natural law. 
This insight raises two further questions: (a) “How does the plain person 
make of the ends which are her or his by nature ends actually and rationally 
directive	of	her	or	his	activities?”	and	(b)	“In	what	social	contexts	do	plain	
persons learn how to order ends rightly and to recognize their mistakes when 
they	have	failed	to	do	so?”	(MacIntyre,	1998b,	p.	139).	How	does	the	natural	
law	come	to	be	recognized	and	intelligently	practiced?	We	do	so	through	be-
ing taught by those more expert than ourselves how to pay attention to and 
how to think about our activities. According to MacIntyre, 
it is through initiation into the ordered relationships of some particular practice 
or practices, through education into the skills and virtues which it or they re-
quire, and through an understanding of the relationship of those skills and vir-
tues to the achievement of the goods internal to that practice or those practices 
that	we	first	find	application	in	everyday	life	for	just	such	a	teleological	scheme	
of understanding as that which Aristotle presents at a very different level of phil-
osophical sophistication in the Nicomachean Ethics….We…become evidently, 
even if unwittingly, Aristotelians. (p. 140)
We	learn	by	doing	and	by	reflecting	on	that	doing	in	concert	with	others.	That	
doing	MacIntyre	(1984)	calls	a	practice,	which	he	defines	as
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any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human ac-
tivity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the 
course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate 
to,	and	partially	definitive	of,	that	form	of	activity,	with	the	result	that	human	
powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods 
involved, are systematically extended. (p. 187)
Practices,	then,	foster	the	virtues	necessary	to	achieve	specific	human	goods.	
Reflection	on	such	practices	and	their	vagaries	is	integral	to	moral	develop-
ment and human achievement.
What	we	learn	from	such	reflection	is	to	make	two	crucial	distinctions.	
First, we learn to distinguish what pleases me here and now from what makes 
for excellence in pursuit of the goods internal to the practice in which I am en-
gaged.	Second,	we	learn	to	distinguish	what	is	good	unqualifiedly	from	what	
is good for me here and now at this stage of my moral progress. Clearly, there 
is	a	reflexive	dynamism	or	dialectic	at	work	here,	one	suggested	by	Aristotle’s	
(1925/1998)	definition	of	virtue	which	invokes	both	“the	mean	relative	to	us”	
(§1106b36-1107b2) at this particular stage of our development and “the man 
of practical wisdom”—the virtuous person in the ideal who has achieved or is 
achieving his telos. As MacIntyre (1998b) puts it, “through a process of learn-
ing, making mistakes, correcting those mistakes and so moving toward the 
achievement of excellence, the individual comes to understand her or himself 
as in via, in the middle of a journey” (p. 140). That journey, as we have seen 
in Aristotle’s perspective itself, is a developmental project.
Or rather, the individual comes to understand her- or himself as simulta-
neously in the middle of various journeys, since “no individual lives her or 
his	life	wholly	within	the	confines	of	any	one	practice”	(MacIntyre,	1998b, 
p.	140).	How	are	the	goods	of	these	various	practices	to	be	ordered?	What	is	
the	supreme	good	which	relativizes	all	other	goods?	That	 is,	 the	plain	per-
son will “from time to time…retrospectively examine…what her or his life 
amounts to as a whole” and so will ask, “ ‘to what conception of my overall 
good	have	I	so	far	committed	myself?	And,	do	I	now	have	reason	to	put	it	in	
question?’”	(p.	141).	Each	of	us	is	a	protagonist	in	“a	story	whose	outcome	
can be success or failure” (p. 141). It is “in terms of the outcomes of particu-
lar narratives about particular lives” that “the conception of a telos of human 
life	is	generally	first	comprehended”	(p.	141).	We	move	from	the	particular	
stories that make up a life to the overall story that is a life, and then to the 
universal story that is human life per se.
In such retrospective self-examination, as plain persons 
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we characteristically draw upon resources provided by some stock stories from 
which we had earlier learned to understand both our own lives and the lives of 
others in narrative terms, the oral and written literature of whatever particular 
culture it is that we happen to inhabit. (MacIntyre, 1998b, p. 141) 
A cultural tradition provides us with a theory of the telos of human life 
that demands our allegiance over rival traditions. Thus, we have arrived at 
what Horton and Mendus (1994) describe as the three central concepts of 
MacIntyre’s moral theory: (a) the narrative and therefore teleological self 
engaged in (b) social practices with their attendant goods and virtues as un-
derstood	in	the	context	of	(c)	a	living	tradition	of	moral	enquiry.	The	first	of	
these three concepts is especially relevant to the present discussion and so 
deserves further analysis.
how Does MacIntyre Understand the Moral Self? 
It is a “central thesis” for MacIntyre (1984) that 
man	is	in	his	actions	and	practice,	as	well	as	in	his	fictions,	a	story-telling	ani-
mal….[For]	I	can	only	answer	the	question	“What	am	I	to	do?”	if	I	can	answer	
the	prior	question	“Of	what	story	or	stories	do	I	find	myself	a	part?”	And	what	
the narrative concept of selfhood requires is…twofold. On the one hand…I am 
the subject of a history that is my own and no one else’s. (p. 216)
And “to be the subject of a narrative that runs from one’s birth to one’s death 
is…to be accountable for the actions and experiences which compose a nar-
ratable life” (p. 217). On the other hand, “I am not only accountable, I am 
one who can always ask others for an account, who can put others to the 
question” (pp. 218-219). And what is the question to which each of us must 
fashion	an	answer	through	the	narratives	of	our	lives?	“What	is	the	good	for	
man?”	indicates	“a	narrative	quest”	that	“is	always	an	education	both	as	to	
the character of that which is sought and in self-knowledge” (pp. 218-219). 
This	perspective	on	the	narrative	unity	of	a	human	life	suggests	a	new	defini-
tion of the virtues:
The virtues therefore are to be understood as those dispositions which will not 
only sustain practices and enable us to achieve the goods internal to practices, 
but which will sustain us in the relevant kind of quest for the good, by en-
abling us to overcome the harms, dangers, temptations and distractions which 
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we encounter, and which will furnish us with increasing self-knowledge and 
increasing knowledge of the good. (p. 219)
The virtues are necessary to particular practices within a life, but also to the 
unity of that life as a whole. This brings MacIntyre to a provisional answer to 
the fundamental question: 
The good life for man is the life spent in seeking for the good life for man, and 
the virtues necessary for the seeking are those which will enable us to under-
stand what more and what else the good life for man is. (p. 219)
Fuller (1998) recapitulates “the basic structure of MacIntyre’s ‘narrative 
unity’ argument” as follows:
(1) We should…drop Aristotle’s and Aquinas’s “metaphysical biology,” since it 
has been discredited by modern science….(2) We can retain the intelligibility of 
the idea of a telos for human life by suggesting that each human being can and 
must provide their own telos by “telling themselves a story” about their own 
life….(3) But, in practice, each individual’s story interlocks with other individu-
als’ stories. (4) A principal form of such interlocking is through the shared story 
or stories which membership of the same tradition provides….(5) Such narrative 
intelligibility…is an essential ingredient of having any concrete sense of per-
sonal, intellectual and moral identity….(6) But, in practice, the modern self is 
confronted by a welter of competing traditions….(7) There are principally three 
such competing traditions: (Aristotelian/Thomist) Tradition, Encyclopaedia, 
and Genealogy [see MacIntyre, 1990]. (8) Therefore, if we can effectively argue 
the	case	for	the	greater	coherence	of…[the	first]	of	these	competing	narratives…
we	can…restore	a	fairly	definitive	 telos, identity, and “narrative unity” to the 
bewildered modern self. (pp. 118-119)
In sum, for MacIntyre (1998b) there can be no coherent personal moral 
identity apart from participation in a tradition of social practices and moral 
enquiry. We are all anonymous Aristotelians because “every human being…
lives out her or his life in a narrative form which is structured in terms of a 
telos, of virtues and of rules in an Aristotelian mode” (p. 146). It is of course 
possible for a person to fail to learn and to practice well this Aristotelian 
mode. Indeed, it is MacIntyre’s indictment of modern moral philosophy spe-
cifically	 and	modern	 culture	 generally	 that	 each	 has	 fostered	 such	 failure.	
One of MacIntyre’s (1984) essential complaints against modernity is that 
“when the distinctively modern self was invented…what was invented was 
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the individual” (p. 61), and that “the self thus conceived…is now thought of 
as criterionless, because the kind of telos in terms of which it once judged and 
acted is no longer thought to be credible” (p. 33). We live “after virtue.” The 
typically modern self has no “home” (tradition) in which to learn the virtues. 
But to the extent that we engage in social practices governed by norms that 
point toward goods internal to those practices and which can only be achieved 
through the development of the relevant virtues, and to the extent that such 
practices	compel	us	to	reflect	on	how	those	goods	are	to	be	ordered	relative	
to our overall good and to the good for humans per se, as well as to the extent 
that we come to understand that we can only answer such questions in terms 
of a living tradition, to that extent we are all, however unwittingly, proto- 
Aristotelians.	 But	 that	 answers	 only	 our	 first	 two	 questions.	 What	 is 
MacIntyre’s fuller analysis of the contextual challenges facing the education 
of	the	moral	self	into	the	virtues?	In	a	word,	what	are	MacIntyre’s	politics?
Are We All Anonymous Revolutionary Aristotelians? 
Knight (1996) offers an accurate summary of MacIntyre’s political views. 
Knight begins with a review of MacIntyre’s moral theory and his critique 
of other theories, which Knight sums up this way: “Aristotelianism is…less 
a particular (syllogistic) conception of practical rationality than the general 
rationality of practices as such, in contrast with which all other rationalities 
may be described as ideologies” (p. 888). Although the point is not elab-
orated, Knight makes this interesting observation on MacIntyre’s behalf: 
“Aristotelianism is the tradition of the moral theory of practice that has devel-
oped in the West, but other civilizations have other such traditions” (p. 889). 
We begin to move outward from MacIntyre’s analysis of practices as 
such with the following distinction: “Practices must not be confused with in-
stitutions” (as cited in Knight, 1996, p. 889). Medicine is a practice; a hospi-
tal is an institution. Institutions are concerned with money, power, and status. 
Institutions make practices possible, but whereas practices tend to be coop-
erative, institutions tend to be competitive. “In this context,” in MacIntyre’s 
own words, “the essential function of the virtues is clear. Without them, with-
out justice, courage and truthfulness, practices could not resist the corrupt-
ing power of institutions” (as cited in Knight, 1996, p. 889). Money, power, 
and status are what MacIntyre calls goods external to practices (Knight, 
1996). There is an inevitable tension between the goods internal to and the 
goods external to practices. How that tension is played out depends on the 
culture. Institutions should serve practices and internal goods should be 
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honored more than external goods, however necessary those external goods 
are to the practices. 
“In the post-Enlightenment world, however, the reverse rationale has in-
creasingly prevailed. Both capitalist corporations and states are structured in 
the same, bureaucratic way” (Knight, 1996, p. 890). And the managerial rea-
soning common to both “entails the obliteration of any distinction between 
manipulative and non-manipulative social relations by denying the reality of 
the latter” (p. 890). Management, from MacIntyre’s point of view, “is a mere 
technique, not a practice with goods internal to itself” (Knight, 1996, p. 890), 
so that in the characteristic institutions of modern culture, what MacIntyre 
calls the “goods of effectiveness” are more highly valued than the “goods of 
excellence.” This “moral error” is at the heart of MacIntyre’s critique of mo-
dernity (Knight, 1996, p. 891). This moral reversal is particularly apparent in 
MacIntyre’s	comments	on	the	identification	of	pleonexia or acquisitiveness 
as a vice in Aristotelian theory and as a virtue in capitalist cultures. In the 
former, work is understood as a practice whose rewards are primarily inter-
nal to it, while in the latter, work is undertaken primarily in order to acquire 
external goods. Given the pervasive entrenchment of such a moral reversal, 
what	is	to	be	done?
According to Knight (1996), MacIntyre believes that “the problem is not 
to	reform	the	dominant	order,	but	to	find	ways	for	local	communities	to	sur-
vive by sustaining a life of the common good against the disintegrating forces 
of the nation-state and the market” (p. 894).
Accordingly, the tasks for a politics in the Aristotelian tradition are to defend 
the rationality, ideals, creativity and cooperative care for common goods of 
practices against institutional corruption and managerial manipulation, and to 
uphold internal goods of excellence against external goods and claims of ef-
fectiveness. (p. 895) 
In this context, MacIntyre indicates what role the university might play in 
such Aristotelian politics. “The ‘peculiar and [socially] essential function’ of 
universities is, now, to be ‘places where…the wider society [can] learn how 
to conduct its own debates…in a rationally defensible way’” (Knight, 1996, 
p. 895). MacIntyre’s politics are obviously revolutionary in a very particular 
way. There seem to be no barricades, not even metaphorical ones, in sight.
On the other hand, in the introduction to the revised edition of Marxism	
and Christianity, MacIntyre (1995) argues that “an adequate regard for justice 
always involves not only a concern that justice be done and injustice prevent-
ed or remedied on any particular occasion, but also resistance to and, where 
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possible, the abolition of institutions that systematically generate injustice” 
(p. vii). Where possible, MacIntyre does indeed seem to envision reform of 
the dominant order through the abolition of unjust institutions. Just how broad 
an agenda this might be is indicated by his subsequent assertion that “capital-
ism…provides systematic incentives to develop a type of character that has a 
propensity to injustice” (p. xiv). But then he draws back from that potentially 
more revolutionary agenda by urging that “the need” is “to construct and sus-
tain practice-based forms of local participatory community that will be able to 
survive the insidious and destructive pressure of contemporary capitalism and 
of the modern state” (p. xxxi). But what does that mean for the social practice 
that	is	moral	education?	
What is MacIntyre’s 
Analysis of Moral Education in America today? 
What MacIntyre (1998a) has written about in “Aquinas’s Critique of 
Education” might well represent his Aristotelian perspective on contempo-
rary American education:
Where for Aquinas education presupposes a background of shared moral be-
liefs, the dominant educational ideals of contemporary America presuppose a 
morally heterogeneous and divided society. Where for Aquinas the goal of edu-
cation is the achievement of a comprehensive and completed understanding, in 
modern America what education offers are skills and knowledge designed to en-
able the student to pursue the satisfaction of her or his preferences, whatever—
within certain very wide limits—they may be. And where for Aquinas what the 
individual is to be measured by, in education as elsewhere, is her or his success 
or failure in directing her- or himself towards the human good, the dominant 
culture of the American present takes it for granted that there is no such thing 
as the human good, but that each individual must at some point choose for her- 
or himself among a variety of different and rival conceptions of the good. A 
good education is then an education that prepares individuals for making such 
choices. And by that standard a Thomist education is a bad education. (p. 107)
And by that same contemporary standard, a truly Aristotelian moral educa-
tion is a bad education. Given the current popularity of character education 
programs in the United States, MacIntyre’s critique of American education 
might seem not only unduly harsh but simply off the mark. In fact, with-
out ever using the term character education, MacIntyre (1999) provides 
a devastating critique in his wryly titled essay, “How to Seem Virtuous 
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Without Actually Being So.” An examination of that essay will help us put 
Aristotelian moral education in critical tension with the actual practice of the 
preferred mode of character education in America today, which often claims 
an Aristotelian pedigree (e.g., Bennett, 1993; Lickona, 1991; Murphy, 2002; 
Ryan & Bohlin, 1999). 
In “How to Seem Virtuous Without Actually Being So,” MacIntyre (1999) 
argues	for	two	conclusions.	The	first	is	that	not	all	virtue-concepts	are	created	
equal. Any rationally defensible account must distinguish between genuine 
and counterfeit virtues. Second, because our society includes 
a number of rival and incompatible accounts of the virtues….there can be no 
rationally defensible shared programme for moral education for our society as 
such,	 but	 only	 a	number	of	 rival	 and	 conflicting	programmes,	 each	 from	 the	
standpoint	of	one	specific	contending	view.	(p.	118)	
If modern moral philosophy and culture is “after virtue,” a fortiori modern 
moral education is after virtue education. But “the proponents of shared pub-
lic	moral	education,”	who	are	“enormously	influential…insist	to	the	contrary	
that we do in fact share a morality” (p. 118). How does MacIntyre refute this 
claim	for	a	commonplace	morality?
According to MacIntyre (1999), any “tolerably systematic and coherent 
understanding	of	the	virtues”	(p.	119)	must	answer	four	questions.	The	first	
concerns “counterfactual judgments.” If I judge an act to be virtuous, to what 
judgments	am	I	necessarily	committed	in	other	circumstances?	Judgments	of	
virtue must arise out of a reasonably comprehensive and not merely ad hoc 
or spontaneous perspective, if they are to be rationally defensible. “A second 
[and not logically independent] question concerns the type of reason for act-
ing as he or she does which is ascribed in judging that someone is brave or 
generous or just” (p. 119). One of the differences between genuine and coun-
terfeit virtues is the difference between right and wrong reasons for one and 
the same action. One might perform a courageous act to save another person’s 
life or to call attention to oneself as courageous. Intentions reveal reasons, 
and not all reasons are created morally equal. A third question is closely re-
lated to the second: “What was it, both in the situation and the action, which 
pleased	or	pained	 the	 agent?”	 (p.	 120).	We	are	 reminded	 that	 the	virtuous	
person, according to Aristotle (1998), will be pleased or pained in the right 
way	at	the	right	things.	MacIntyre’s	(1999)	fourth	and	final	question	that	all	
rationally defensible accounts of the virtues must answer is “what range of 
different	types	of	situation	provides	a	sufficient	warrant	for	such	an	ascription	
of	a	virtue	to	that	individual?”	(p.	121).	This	question	emphasizes	the	need	for	
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a systematic and comprehensive account of the virtues, including regard for 
each of the concerns raised by the three previous questions.
MacIntyre (1999) argues that “the answers supplied by commonplace us-
age are highly indeterminate” (p. 121). Any shared public program of moral 
education will necessarily be open and thin if it is to claim allegiance within 
a heterogeneous and divided society. Indeed, 
what our contemporary political culture requires from those who claim public 
and political authority is an appearance of virtue congruent with the rhetoric 
of shared values. And both the appearance and that rhetoric are well served 
by the indeterminancy of the virtue-concepts of contemporary commonplace 
usage. (p. 122)
It is important to note that MacIntyre is not arguing that it is impossible for 
individuals ever to act virtuously in contemporary society, but that a publicly 
supported program of moral education is unlikely to foster genuine virtue 
as a matter of course. It is more likely that individuals will, through no fault 
of their own, learn to seem virtuous without actually being so. Genuine vir-
tues, as we have seen MacIntyre argue previously, depend on social practices 
aimed at genuine human goods within living traditions of moral enquiry into 
the human good per se. Such traditions provide highly determinate answers 
to MacIntyre’s four questions. And that determinancy can presently be found 
only in local communities that are countercultural. The culture to which they 
are counter, of course, is precisely that culture in which a commonplace rhet-
oric of shared morality can produce only counterfeit virtues.
MacIntyre’s (1999) second conclusion toward which his argument moves 
concerns moral education more directly: “All education into the virtues, es-
pecially the education of the young, has to begin by discovering some way 
of transforming the motivations of those who are to be so educated” (p. 123). 
The problem faced by moral educators “is how to enable their pupils to come 
to value goods just as and insofar as they are goods, and virtues just as and 
insofar as they are virtues” (p. 123). But it is exactly this motivation and 
this valuation that a thin, open, and indeterminate commonplace moral edu-
cation cannot systematically produce. Again, graduates of such a program 
may occasionally 
do what a genuinely virtuous person would do…but because they have misiden-
tified	what	 it	 is	about	 these	actions	 that	would	make	 them	genuine	examples	
of some particular virtue, they will extrapolate falsely in making inferences as 
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to what the virtues require in situations other than those with which they were at 
first	familiarized.	(p.	123)	
The crucial difference is that 
true judgments about what virtues are required in some particular situation…
always either presuppose or are explicitly derived from some conception of the 
human telos as being the achievement of a type of life of which the virtues are 
necessary constitutive parts. (p. 124)
It is precisely this telos that a shared public program of moral education in 
a heterogeneous society cannot agree on, perhaps even argue constructively 
about, as MacIntyre (1998a) has argued that “the American present takes for 
granted that there is no such thing as the human good” (p. 107). And as “there 
is no theory-neutral, pre-philosophical, yet adequately determinate account 
of the virtues….so it also becomes clear that there can be no theory-neutral 
education into the practice of the virtues” (MacIntyre, 1999, p. 126).
I have previously pointed out MacIntyre’s (1999) argument that 
“Aristotelianism is…at odds with the standpoint of the established economic 
systems of advanced modernity” (p. 128). He now argues that because
that this is so strengthens [his] claim that there is no non-controversial stance to 
be taken on the virtues, and that this is so in a way and to a degree that makes it 
impossible for there to be a single shared public system of moral education with 
determinate and substantive moral content. (p. 128) 
From MacIntyre’s Aristotelian perspective, moral education as a social prac-
tice conducive to the development of virtue can only be genuine within local 
communities alternative and resistant to the counterfeit morality of common-
place rhetoric. It is not too strong to say that for MacIntyre there is a real pos-
sibility that the modern self as such cannot be a fully realized moral self. A 
fractured polis militates against the integration of the self into a coherent tra-
dition of virtuous living. The education of the moral self can only be practiced 
in opposition to the social conditions of post-Enlightenment managerial, ac-
quisitive individualism. If “the barbarians…have already been governing us 
for quite some time” (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 263), moral educators must sit up, 
take notice, and respond accordingly. They may be the new St. Benedict that 
MacIntyre is awaiting.
This, then, is the framework MacIntyre provides in which to think about 
education for justice in Catholic education today. If the crucial question we 
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must ask ourselves is how to form our students to be insightful, faithful, 
lifelong agents for social change whatever their career or profession, then 
MacIntyre offers a compelling and challenging answer: We justice educa-
tors must be at least countercultural if not revolutionary Aristotelians. A few 
further questions come quickly to mind. What are the social practices that 
structure	our	courses,	programs,	and	curricula?	What	are	the	virtues	neces-
sary	to	those	practices?	How	does	our	Catholic,	Christian	heritage	provide	a	
determinate narrative that ultimately forms our ideal of the persons we and 
our	students	are	meant	 to	become?	In	a	world	of	gross	 injustice,	violence,	
and suffering, what is the human telos that informs our teaching, learning, 
research,	and	way	of	proceeding?	
MacIntyre, human Rights, and Catholic Social teaching 
There is one major obstacle, however, to a Catholic justice educator’s full 
embrace of a MacIntyrian perspective, and that is his dismissal of the lan-
guage of human rights, which is for him an expression of that commonplace 
morality, in this case a morality with global pretensions, that can produce no 
genuine virtue. Can the language of human rights be legitimately preserved as 
central to programs of justice education despite MacIntyre’s (1984) claim that 
human	rights	are	no	more	real	than	witches	or	unicorns?	Hollenbach	(1994)	
describes a posture from which to answer this important question. 
Hollenbach (1994) begins with this arresting observation: 
During the last century and a half, the Roman Catholic church has moved from 
strong opposition to the rights championed by liberal thinkers of the 18th and 
19th centuries to the position of one of the leading institutional advocates for 
human rights on the world stage today. (p. 127) 
How can this dramatic	moral	reversal	be	explained?	Hollenbach’s	thesis	is	that	
the pivot on which this reconstruction [of human rights] turns is the tradition-
al natural-law conviction that the human person is an essentially social being. 
Catholic thought and action in the human rights sphere, in other words, are root-
ed in a communitarian alternative to liberal human rights theory. Because of 
this stress on the communal rather than the individualist grounding of rights, 
contemporary Catholic discussions of constitutional democracy and free-market 
capitalism diverge in notable ways from the liberal theories of rights that are 
regnant today. (p. 128) 
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To quote Gaudium et Spes (Vatican Council II, 1965), since “God’s plan 
gives man’s vocation a communitarian nature” (§30), “more than an indi-
vidualistic ethic is required” (§24). It is against this background of commu-
nitarian anthropology that Hollenbach (1994) remarks that “the most pointed 
objection to human rights theory on Aristotelian-Thomistic grounds is that of 
Alasdair MacIntyre” (p. 129).
MacIntyre assumes that because human rights are framed as universal by 
Enlightenment philosophy and post-Enlightenment liberalism that they are 
necessarily at odds with community and the common good. If that assump-
tion were true, Catholicism and human rights would have to part company. 
But that this assumption is mistaken can be seen by even a cursory review of 
Pope John XXIII’s (1963) encyclical, Pacem in Terris, in which the common 
good	and	human	rights	are	explicitly	linked	and	even	defined	in	terms	of	one	
another.	John	famously	defines	the	common	good	as	“the	sum	total	of	those	
conditions of social living whereby men [sic] are enabled to achieve their 
own integral perfection more fully and easily” (§58). In their 1986 pastoral 
letter, Economic Justice for All, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops 
further	refine	this	tradition	by	defining	human	rights	as	the	“minimum	condi-
tions for life in community” (§79). As Hollenbach (1994) puts it, “understood 
this way, rights language does not presuppose an individualistic view of the 
person….It begins rather with a discussion of the ‘responsibilities of social 
living’” (p. 141), a contemporary articulation of the biblical imperative to 
love one’s neighbor.
Having articulated this communitarian ethic of human rights, Hollenbach 
then considers the charge that is sometimes leveled against MacIntyre: 
that his emphasis on local community and tradition makes him a relativist. 
MacIntyre’s own rebuttal has been to argue for intellectual engagement be-
tween rival traditions toward more adequate formulations of truth. Traditions 
must be open to correction through encounter with other traditions. But ac-
cording	 to	Hollenbach	 (1994),	MacIntyre	 “has	 failed	 so	 far	 to	 reflect	 suf-
ficiently	 on	 the	 institutional	 implications	 of	 his	 commitment	 to	 inquiry	 as	
constitutive of any tradition that is in working order.” But if he is to follow 
through on this commitment, “he must endorse rights such as freedom of 
speech and religion. Without these rights, participation in inquiry must come 
to an end….MacIntyre’s animus against the idea of human rights is self-
contradictory” (pp. 143-144). The creation of the virtuous community, says 
Hollenbach, depends on the acknowledgement of human rights beyond one’s 
own community of practice and inquiry. We learn the natural law language 
of universal human rights through authentic encounter with those outside our 
immediate communities of discourse.
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Within Catholic tradition it is no contradiction to organize a moral educa-
tion	program	with	an	emphasis	on	social	justice	defined	in	terms	of	universal	
human rights and to think of that program as fostering a community of stu-
dents and teachers mutually engaged in learning what it means to practice the 
virtues over a lifetime of social engagement. That second dimension makes 
us, as MacIntyre would say, revolutionary Aristotelians. But that hardly pre-
cludes us from being countercultural Catholic Christians committed to uni-
versal human rights. Indeed, it demands it. 
Practical Implications 
Practice	flowing	from	this	educational	philosophy	obviously	cannot	be	lim-
ited to the occasional or even regular lesson plan devoted to the various 
dimensions of Catholic morality. In MacIntyre’s vision, it is the ongoing, self-
critical moral life of the community as a whole, rooted in a living tradition, 
which forms and educates each successive generation. In this last section, I 
review examples of how that vision might be embodied in (a) teacher-student 
relations at the primary level, (b) an extracurricular retreat program at the 
secondary level, and (c) curricular content and pedagogical structure in a uni-
versity course. 
Educational philosopher Nel Noddings (1992) has argued that continu-
ity in teacher-student relations is crucial to the development of classrooms 
as caring communities in which moral concerns and behaviors are modeled 
by the teacher, practiced by the students, and examined by teacher and stu-
dents in dialogue. Noddings proposes that the creativity and depth of these 
relations would be enhanced if teachers and students stayed together, always 
subject to their mutual agreement, for longer than one school year. For ex-
ample,	a	teacher	would	continue	with	his	or	her	first	graders	as	they	moved	
on to second and even third grade. This would mitigate the need to begin 
each year with the task of building a new community of learners in the class-
room, and would create the opportunity to deepen the mutual trust and per-
sonal knowledge that had been established between teacher and students the 
previous year.
We rightly lament that too often children in foster care are passed from 
one family to the next and the next, as we know this hinders the development 
of their ability to relate trustfully to other persons, which is so crucial for 
moral formation generally. And yet, albeit in less troubled circumstances, we 
currently make a practice of that very pattern by limiting teacher-student rela-
tions to 9 months. If, as MacIntyre argues, community is essential to a mor-
al education in the virtues, and if, as Noddings (1992) proposes, continuity 
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of teacher-student relations enhances caring and therefore community, then 
keeping teachers and students together for more than one school year seems 
an appropriate way for Catholic elementary schools to bolster their efforts to 
form trusting, caring children receptive to the Catholic moral vision.
Although caring relations between teacher and student are never unim-
portant at any level of education, at the secondary level it may be especially 
important for Catholic educators to create ample opportunities for the foster-
ing of healthy peer relations and community among their adolescent charges. 
Whereas	my	first	example	portrayed	a	structural	dimension	of	primary	ed-
ucation aimed at the enhancement of classroom relations and learning, my 
second example comes from outside the classroom. Few moral and spiritual 
formation programs are as successful and emulated as the freshmen retreat 
at a nearby Catholic high school. To quote one student’s own testimonial, 7 
years later, to the power of that experience:
The Freshmen Retreat offered…a communal space in which male adolescents 
such as myself could realize that they continue to be precisely that—male ad-
olescents—and yet open themselves up to a more emotionally vulnerable and 
spiritually grounded way of relating to each other. There were many elements 
for which I am still thankful: the tremendous generosity of the large team of 
upperclassmen who every year guided the freshmen through the weekend; the 
shared small group discussions in which masks could fall away and true feelings 
emerge; the afternoon service project to remind us that our spiritual growth was 
not to be isolated from the wider world. Most of all, I remember the so-called 
“witness talks.” During one long night in a large open room, students would one 
by one take the microphone in front of hundreds to speak of God in their lives. 
Their words often expressed what I was distinctly starting to feel, that God, 
rather than being experienced as a distant Other, is to be found most readily in 
the richness of people relating lovingly in community. 
A full description of the retreat is neither possible nor necessary here, but 
the	reflection	above	does	indicate	its	most	important	elements:	The	retreat	is	
crafted to appeal to present-day young male adolescents in communal settings 
both intimate and expansive; it is organized and led under the tutelage of adult 
staff and faculty, and its value modeled by upperclassmen who have attended 
10 preparatory meetings; it makes use of small group sharing to foster affec-
tive vulnerability; it is “outer” and mission-directed while grounded in the “in-
ner” and interpersonal; and it fosters a quintessentially Catholic sacramental 
and moral vision of the presence of God in the human person and especially in 
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human relationships and community. It offers a genuine rite of passage, if not 
into full moral and spiritual adulthood, then certainly into its antechamber.
A	final	example	of	a	“MacIntyre-friendly”	pedagogical	practice	is	from	
the Justice and Peace Studies Program at Creighton University. The class, 
Faith & Moral Development, is innovative in at least two ways. First, although 
it is a 3-credit hour course, it consists of three 1-credit hour, student-led semi-
nars over three semesters. And although the individual seminar rosters will 
vary, there is enough consistency of membership, format, and purpose that 
students develop a modest sense of community and  sense of shared commit-
ment to social justice and to a spirituality to support that commitment over the 
long haul. Second, students take turns leading the discussion of writings by or 
about moral exemplars such as Dorothy Day, Martin Luther King, Jr., and the 
villagers of Le Chambon, France, who rescued Jewish children from the Nazi 
war machine during World War II. In addition to case studies that give students 
a glimpse of a heroic legacy, we also consider various theoretical perspectives 
(psychological, philosophical, theological) on the faith and moral develop-
ment of such exemplars, who provide diverse but compelling images and nar-
ratives of the human telos so important to MacIntyre’s Aristotelian vision. 
Catholic educators have much to learn from MacIntyre about teaching 
justice in our present cultural and historical circumstances. His ideas merit 
consideration and his challenges deserve response.
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